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Abstract 
Explanations of states’ security decisions prioritize structural – systemic, 
institutional, and cultural – constraints, characterizing foreign security 
decisions as a function of external-international, domestic-institutional, or 
normative-cultural factors.  By systematically examining Turkey’s 1990-
1991 and 2003 Iraqi war decisions, we problematize this prioritization of 
structure, and investigate the dynamic relationship between structural 
constraints and leaders in their decision-making environments. In these 
cases, while the structural constraints remain constant or indeterminate, 
the decision outcomes and the decision-making process differ 
significantly. Our findings, based on structured-focused comparison, 
process tracing, and leadership trait analysis, suggest that leaders’ 
personalities and how they react to constraints account for this difference 
and that dependence on only one set of factors leads to an incomplete 
understanding of security policies and international politics.  We 
contribute to the broader understanding of leaders’ personalities by 
suggesting that self confidence and cognitive complexity are key traits 
distinguishing leaders’ orientations toward structural constraints. 
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In 1990-1991 and 2003, Turkey faced critical foreign policy choices 
concerning its neighbour, Iraq.  In both cases, Turkey was pressured by the United 
States to support US-led military action against Iraq.  This pressure, accompanied by 
promises of economic rewards, from an important ally had to be balanced with 
concerns of instability that the military interventions would create – instability both 
across and within Turkish borders.  In the first Gulf War, President Turgut Özal 
steered Turkey through controversial decisions, including the closing of the Turkish-
Iraqi oil pipeline and the deployment of US troops in Turkey.  In the second Gulf 
War, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, upon assuming power as Prime Minister during the 
decision making process, was faced with questions of whether Turkey would allow 
the stationing of US troops on its soil and over-flight rights.  Both leaders supported 
cooperation with US requests, but faced significant domestic opposition.  Özal 
dominated the decision making in the first Gulf war, even though he had no specific 
constitutional authority to do so, and engineered Turkish cooperation with the US-led 
military offensive against Iraq. Erdoğan, on the other hand, delegated authority and 
bungled a parliamentary vote that resulted in a rejection to the stationing of US troops 
and the preclusion of a northern front in the invasion of Iraq.  Both episodes were 
significant junctures in Turkish-US relations. 
In this study, we argue that foreign policy making involves a dynamic 
relationship between political leadership as agency and the international, institutional 
and cultural constraints as structure. Throughout, we use the term ‘structure’ as the 
context in which action takes place; it not only limits but also shapes and propels 
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behaviour. By agency, we mean the role of humans in the decision-making process. 
We illustrate the dynamic structure-agency interaction in the Turkish decision-making 
context analysing the 1991 and 2003 Iraq war decisions. These cases are especially 
suitable for the purpose of our argument because while structural constraints were 
similar or indeterminate between Turkey’s Iraq war decisions, the processes and 
choices were very different. This, we conclude, is indicative of the dynamic 
relationship between agency and structure.  Specifically, we see two leaders, Özal in 
the first Iraq war and Erdoğan in the second Iraq war, with very different orientations 
toward structural constraints.  These different orientations stem from certain 
personality traits, which influence both the process and outcome of these critical 
decision-making episodes in Turkey’s foreign policy. 
 
 
International and Domestic Structural Explanations in Security Policy 
 Structural explanations of security decisions, at both the international-systemic 
and the internal-domestic levels, are familiar to all students of international politics.  
From the neo-realist focus on anarchy and distribution of power (e.g., Gilpin 1983; 
Waltz 1979) to liberalism’s expectations on the constraining factors of economic 
interdependent structures and international regimes (e.g., Krasner 1983; Keohane and 
Nye 1977), security policy is seen as a product of international pressures faced by 
states and their leaders.  System-level constructivism also focuses on role structures 
(e.g., Wendt 1999) and normative structures (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) to 
explain state behaviour according to logics of appropriateness and constructed 
expectations of self and other.   
 4 
 Other constructivists look inside the state at the domestic-societal level and 
point to cultural norms and values, operating as structures of constraint on leaders and 
foreign policy (e.g., Berger 1998).  Similarly, the cultural explanation of democratic 
peace focuses on societal norms and values that encourage peaceful means of conflict 
resolution when democratic states are dealing with other democracies who hold 
similar liberal values (Owen 1994).  The institutional explanation of democratic peace 
stresses the role of institutional structures and the constitutional checks and balances 
that tie the hands of leaders through accountability to a more peaceful public (Russett 
1993). Both rational choice theories of domestic costs (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003) and neo-classical realism’s conception of the executive who must bargain with 
domestic political actors to extract resources in order to respond to international 
pressures (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009) also see political-domestic 
structures as limits on security policy. 
Other institutional factors can constrain leaders.  Government structures that 
create multiparty coalitions, for example, put multiple actors, or ‘veto-players,’ in 
control of state policy. Multiparty government can bog down decision-making and 
create fragmented policy and excessive compromises; coalition governments may be 
more vulnerable to junior party influence and inter-party politics (e.g., Palmer, 
London, and Regan 2004).  In addition, decision-making rules, legal provisions as 
provided by the constitution (i.e., which decisions need to be made or approved by the 
parliament), different institutional arrangements that lead to formation of different 
decision-units, the relationship between the executive and the legislature, as well as 
within party disagreements can create further structural constraints on foreign policy-
making.  
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Many of these issues become particularly complicated when the executive 
cannot make a decision such as “declaration of war” or “sending troops abroad” by 
itself or without the approval of the parliament (see, Hänggi 2004).  In this regard, 
certain legal provisions, parliamentary opposition, and inter/intra-party 
factionalisation may limit the ease and speed of decision-making processes in both 
single and multi-party cabinets.  Prime ministers (or cabinets) try to avoid taking an 
issue to parliament if there is a chance that the bill, or the government, would be 
challenged by opposition parties or party backbenchers in parliament.  Similarly, they 
may simply wait until it becomes possible for them to promote consensus-based 
policies (Wagner 2006; LeBlang and Chan 2003).  
Overall, many approaches to security policy emphasize the constraints 
imposed on political leaders by various structural forces. This literature 
underemphasizes the role of the political leadership and does not examine how 
different leaders view national goals, interpret international, institutional, and cultural 
constraints, or how they try to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Some leaders 
may indeed challenge structural constraints or be less open to incoming information 
in order to maintain their positions and divert attention from more disturbing issues 
(Hermann and Kegley 1995). In sum, leaders are not determined by structures, but 
instead interact with them as security policies are made. Although importance of both 
the context of structural constraints and the characteristics of leaders has been 
recognized (e.g., Giddens 1984; Dessler 1989; Carlsnaes 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2011), research is still largely silent on the question 
of how structural constraints are shaped and interpreted by leaders and whether or not 
all agents are equally constrained or empowered by structures.  We agree that “a 
major impediment to the development of adequate explanation and prediction in the 
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study of international relations and foreign policy is the failure by many academics in 
the field to treat seriously the role of psychology factors in individual decision making 
and intergroup relations” (Goldgeier 1997: 137). 
 
 
Leaders’ Orientations Toward Structural Constraints 
Decision-makers are the central agents in the foreign policy making process.  
Presidents and prime ministers are the leaders (in democratic states) that face the 
international and domestic structures that may constrain their actions and choices.  
Yet they also interpret, construct, and shape these structures.  Key to this relationship 
is their orientation toward constraints:  leaders vary in how they respond to their 
environments.  Some confront structural barriers and pressures; others defer to or 
work within them.  Leaders’ orientations to structures are based on key personality 
differences. 
Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is one of the most prominent approaches to 
the study of political leaders.  This framework, developed by Margaret G. Hermann, 
integrates her decades of research on the role of personality characteristics in foreign 
policy (e.g. Hermann 1980; 1984; 1987a; 1987b; 2003). In this approach, personality 
is conceptualized as a combination of seven traits: belief in ability to control events, 
conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias, self-
confidence, and task orientation. LTA has been used to study the personalities of 
many leaders, including US presidents, British Prime Ministers, sub-Saharan African 
leaders, and heads of international organizations. This research suggests that these 
personality traits indeed systematically link to a leaders’ decision-making behaviours 
and foreign policy choices. 
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The LTA framework is particularly useful for investigating Turkish leaders’ 
reaction in the Iraq Wars.  The framework specifically conceptualizes how leaders 
differ in their reaction to structural constraints.  Unlike other approaches (e.g., 
operational code research), LTA captures leaders styles of interacting with others, 
rather than the content of leaders’ beliefs.  According to Hermann, an LTA-based 
personality profile systematically links to a leader’s propensity to challenge or respect 
constraints in their environments, their openness to information and advice, the 
structure of their advisory systems, the quality of the decision making process, and the 
policies leaders choose for their country or organization. Previous research supports 
these links (e.g., Hermann 2003; Kille and Scully 2003; Dyson 2006; Schafer and 
Crichlow 2010).   Hermann (2003) suggests that the seven traits combine in particular 
ways to produce specific behaviours.  Leaders who have a high belief in their ability 
to control events and a high need for power, for example, are expected to challenge 
constraints.  Conceptual complexity and self-confidence are related to and predict 
leaders’ openness to information.  
Thus, the advantage of using the LTA framework for investigating agent-
structure relations is that it provides specific expectations regarding which 
characteristics of leaders matter and how.  In other words, leaders with different traits 
are expected to relate to their context, institutional setting, costs and benefits of 
various policy options, and other agents in theoretically meaningful and predictable 
ways.  Furthermore, the LTA approach provides a reliable, systematic, and 
comparative method for assessing agent characteristics. 
 
 
Method of Investigation:  Case Studies & Content Analysis  
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 We combine structured-focused case comparison (George and McKeown 
1985; Mahoney 2004) and process-tracing (Checkel 2008; Bennett 2010) with at-a-
distance content analysis (Schafer and Walker 2006). With this mixed-method 
approach, we situate personality profiles of political leaders in their context, 
comparing the contexts in a structured-focused fashion, through in-depth process-
tracing of decision-making.  We examine four specific cases; each case is an occasion 
for decision, defined as an instance to which a decision unit has to react (Hermann et 
al. 2001).  There are usually numerous occasions for decision as governments respond 
to policy situations and this was true for Turkey in both Iraq wars. For the purposes of 
this article, we identify two critical occasions for decision for each time period and 
analyse how political agents (leaders) interacted with structures in a detailed tracing 
of the decision-making process. We specifically examine the cases for similarities and 
differences in terms of the operative structural constraints.  These cases are “crucial in 
the strongest sense” (Gerring 2007) because they are very similar to each other with 
the exception of leaders’ personalities that a comparative study of them will provide 
“the strongest sort of evidence possible in a nonexperimental setting” (Gerring 
2007:232) to confirm or disconfirm our arguments regarding the dynamic relationship 
between structural constraints and leaders in their decision-making environments.  
Evidence for the comparative case studies comes from descriptive accounts of the 
decision-making process written by journalists, diplomats, and other scholars and 
from semi-structured interviews we conducted in July and August 2013.  The primary 
agents for this analysis are Turgut Özal (for the first Iraqi War) and Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan (for the second Iraqi War).  
  Özal was the Turkish Prime Minister (1983-1989) from the Motherland Party, 
and then served as President (1989-1993).  Erdoğan became the Turkish Prime 
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Minister in March 2003, in the middle of decision-making regarding the Iraq war. He 
was, however, head of the ruling Justice and Development Party throughout this 
period and his eventual assumption of the Prime Ministership was expected.  These 
leaders were certainly not alone in Turkish foreign policy making, but they were 
central.   
Prime Ministers are typically regarded as one of the three actors in a “tripod” 
that directs Turkish foreign policy (Makovsky and Sayarı 2000).  As the head of the 
party that controls a majority (or the largest number of seats) in the parliament, the 
Prime Minister has the constitutional authority to direct foreign policy through the 
cabinet (the Council of Ministers) and is generally very influential in both processes 
and outcomes (Makovsky and Sayarı 2000).  The foreign ministry and the military are 
also considered important actors in foreign policy.  Compared to other democracies, 
the Turkish military is much more active in governance, as it has intervened in 
decisions and in the removal of civilian governments (Makovsky 1999). The main 
institution through which the military has influenced policymaking is the Milli 
Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK), Turkey’s ‘National Security Council.’ Composed of 
military and civilian members (including the President, Prime Minister, and Foreign 
and Defence Ministers), it serves as an advisory body in security related matters.  
The Presidency in Turkey is typically viewed as a symbolic position and many 
presidents have interpreted their role as one that is “above politics.”  Whereas the 
1982 Constitution certainly strengthened the position of the President and made the 
powers of the President more important during weak governments (Özcan 2008:153), 
including in the foreign policy domain, he is considered to be the head of the state, 
and therefore expected to represent the state, as opposed to the government.  This 
differentiation means that the President does not have to nor is expected to get 
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involved in party politics. Some presidents, however, have played a much more 
activist role and Özal’s presidency in particular has prompted scholars to include 
presidents as a potentially important player in foreign affairs. President Süleyman 
Demirel and current President Abdullah Gül arguably represent similar activism. In 
contrast, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the President before Gül, did not. Parliament is 
considered a secondary actor in Turkish foreign policy, although Article 92 of the 
constitution gives parliament the authority for foreign troop deployment in Turkey 
and for sending Turkish troops to other countries.  Finally, Turkish leaders are 
accountable to the public in democratic elections; however, elites are seen as having 
great capacity for managing public pressures in the area of foreign policy (Makovsky 
and Sayarı 2000).  In sum, President Özal and Prime Minister Erdoğan were key 
agents in the Iraq decisions, although they faced other agents and structural 
constraints on their ability to make Turkish foreign policy.1 
The personality profiles of Özal and Erdoğan are based on the LTA content 
analysis scheme. For LTA coding, it is assumed that the more frequently leaders use 
certain words and phrases when they speak, the more apparent and salient such 
content is to them and the more it reflects underlying personality traits (Hermann 
2003). Coding is quantitative and employs frequency counts taking the word or phrase 
as the unit of analysis. LTA profiles are now produced with automated machine-
coding using ProfilerPlus, a language parsing software program developed by Social 
Science Automation (SSA).2  The program determines the percentage of particular 
                                                
1 For more on the importance of prime ministers and presidents in Turkish foreign policy, see Özcan 
(2008) Robins (2003b); and Hale (2002). 
2 SSA is headed by Michael R. Young; Margaret Hermann was a co-founder in 1997. In ProfilerPlus, 
SSA converted Hermann’s Leadership Traits Analysis and Steven Walker’s Operational Code Analysis 
hand-coding practices to automated coding (see, www.socialscience.net). 
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words and phrases used by the leaders based on the length of the text.3  The 
percentages for any leader can be compared to those of 284 world political leaders 
and a subset of 46 leaders from the Middle East. Through such comparisons, it 
becomes possible to determine whether the particular leader is high, low, or average 
on a trait (Hermann 2003).  Our primary focus in this paper is comparing the 
leadership traits of Özal with Erdoğan to understand the different ways these leaders 
interacted with structures. 
For this study, we confined the text coded to the time period prior to the 
decisions under investigation: for Özal, from 16 March, 1987 to 7 January, 1991; for 
Erdoğan, from 28 August, 2001 to 9 March, 2003.  Although this is a shorter time 
period for Erdoğan, it was important to restrict this study to these periods because 
leader’s styles may change over time (Hermann 2003) and it would be inappropriate 
to use text spoken after the cases to capture Özal’s and Erdoğan’s personality traits. 
For Özal, we analyse, 44,346 words in 71 documents; for Erdoğan, 9,317 words in 33 
documents, all drawn from interviews with domestic and international media as well 
as from leaders’ spontaneous statements at press briefings.4 The content analysed 
were limited to foreign policy issues. The content analysis was conducted in English 
using ProfilerPlus, Version 5.8.4.  
 Although LTA and other at-a-distance assessments are now, with machine-
coding, reliable, they continue to face a central question of validity: do the words of 
leaders truly reflect their personal beliefs and personality characteristics?  This 
                                                
3 See Hermann (2003) on how scores are calculated on each personality trait. 
4 Erdoğan’s word count is lower because he did not have an official role in decision-making processes. 
This limited his public, spontaneous statements on Iraq. However, by all accounts (including interviews 
of several high-level policymakers from this case), Erdoğan was actively involved in decision-making 
especially concerning decisions that were very critical for the negotiations and the case. 
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question revolves around authorship, audience effects and deception, temporal 
stability, and language differences.  For this study, we address these issues by using 
only interviews and other spontaneous material and not prepared speeches. We 
combine the text across different audience types (i.e. domestic and international), and 
assume that these leaders’ characteristics can be meaningfully assessed in English (if 
the text was originally spoken in English) or in English translations.  We build on 
previous scholarship and assert that leaders do have some control over their speech 
acts and that LTA can capture leaders’ public personalities (if not their private ones) 
which matter more for explaining their decision making style and foreign policy 
choices.5  We also assess the validity of these profiles by pairing them with case 
studies to see if the personality variables play out in the decision-making processes in 
theoretically meaningful ways – if they do, we can have greater confidence that LTA 
is capturing what it purports to measure.    
 
 
Turkey’s First and Second Iraq War Decisions 
The 1990-1991 Iraq War and Occasions for Decisions 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the UN Security Council 
convened within hours and unanimously adopted Resolution 660, demanding that Iraq 
immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait and negotiate through 
peaceful means (Department of Public Information of the United Nations, 1996: 167).  
The United States also demanded reinstatement of the Kuwaiti government 
                                                
5 For discussions and examinations of these issues, see Dille and Young (2000); Marfleet (2000), 
Schafer (2000), Schafer and Crichlow (2000), Schafer and Walker (2006), Renshon (2008), Renshon 
(2009), and Schafer and Crichlow (2010). 
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restoration of regional security and stability (Department of Defence, Final Report to 
the Congress 1992: 22). The United Nations followed with mandatory sanctions on 
Iraq, a shipping blockade, and an authorization for member states to use all necessary 
means to end the Iraqi invasion. When Iraq did not comply, the military intervention 
of the US-led alliance began on 17 January, 1991. The war ended with the 
reinstatement of the Kuwaiti regime and withdrawal of Iraqi forces on 26 February, 
1991. 
Throughout the crisis, Turkey, a neighbour of Iraq with a Muslim majority, 
sided with the United States. There were several important occasions for decision 
confronting the Turkish leadership (Oğuz, 2005; Hale, 2000). These included (1) if 
the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline should be closed and economic sanctions implemented; 
(2) if Turkish troops should be sent to join the coalition forces; (3) if the coalition 
military forces should be allowed to use Turkish soil to launch attacks on Iraq; and (4) 
if a second front should be opened via Turkey.  Among these, the decisions to close 
the oil pipeline and the deployment of US troops to Turkey to launch attacks across 
the Turkish-Iraqi border became the most pressing issues at the time. In both of these 
occasions, President Turgut Özal was not the only person that had the ability to 
commit the country’s resources and had to work with others.  Yet, Özal was very 
much involved in the decision-making process and acted as the prominent political 
actor. 
 
Closing of the Oil Pipeline 
The Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline carried nearly half of Iraq’s oil (Hale 
2000). The US leadership requested Turkey to close the pipelines during the early 
days of the crisis. Özal asked US President Bush to get a UN Security Council 
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resolution to that effect.  After the UN resolution was obtained on 6 August, 1990, an 
occasion for decision was created for Turkish decision-makers.  The major issue was 
whether the economic embargo should be implemented immediately and when the 
pipeline should be closed.  The latter was especially important because the closing of 
the pipeline would be very costly for Turkey, albeit crucial for the successful 
implementation of UN sanctions on Iraq. 
 In the end, the Turkish leadership agreed to close the pipeline in accordance 
with the Security Council resolution, but there was some disagreement between Özal 
and others concerning the timing (Efegil 2002). Initially it seemed as if Turkey was 
going to adopt a wait and see approach and would not close the pipeline right away. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut (from the same 
political party as Özal) stated that Turkey was not ready to impose economic 
sanctions against Iraq and that Turkey should wait for Saudi Arabia’s reaction.  If the 
Saudis declined to close their pipelines, the embargo would not be effective 
(‘Bush’tan Özal’a…’ 1990).  Others, including the Turkish Armed Forces, suggested 
that Turkey would continue to “adhere to its previous policy of remaining strictly 
aloof from Middle Eastern conflicts” (Hale 2000: 220).  While these actors favoured a 
more cautious stance, President Özal’s personal and often secret communications with 
President Bush continued.   
 The Council of Ministers meeting on 7 August, 1990 displayed the 
dominance of Özal as he made his preference clear and declared that he had already 
taken the relevant initiatives. Indeed, that very same day, Özal convened a small 
meeting with the State Minister for Energy, Mehmet Keçeciler, and ordered him to 
declare the pipeline closed (Oğuz 2005: 50-51).  This announcement came as a 
surprise given that the decision was made without the knowledge of some very 
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important decision-makers, including the Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay, whose 
consent was required to make such a decision.  Özal used the meeting of the Council 
of Ministers strategically and made the decision appear as if it were the government’s 
decision.  On 8 August it was announced publicly that Turkey would suspend all 
commercial dealings with Iraq and close the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Yumurtalık.6 
As later reports indicate, Özal put pressure on cabinet ministers to agree with his 
initiatives, despite opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, opposition parties 
in the parliament, and the military (Oran 2001; Efegil 2002). 
 
Allowing US-led Forces Deployment in Turkey 
 When the prospect of a military operation against Iraq became apparent, 
another important occasion for decision emerged.  Turkey hosted several US military 
bases on its soil, and unlike the previous decision, this occasion for decision – 
whether to allow US-led forces to deploy in Turkey – necessitated the approval of the 
Turkish parliament.  Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution requires parliamentary 
approval for foreign forces on Turkish soil for war purposes or for Turkish territory to 
be used in a war situation.  Interestingly, President Özal had already asked Prime 
Minister Akbulut to take the issue to parliament even before a request to deploy 
military forces came from the United States.  According to many, Özal was informed 
about US plans to use bases in Turkey in advance and wanted to ensure parliamentary 
                                                
6 According to Mehmet Keçeciler this decision had to be taken in any case because of the UN 
Resolution. Indeed, the next week US Secretary of State James Baker was visiting Turkey. The 
decision was announced right before Baker’s visit enhanced Turkey’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the 
US as the latter saw this as an important gesture in their partnership. (Authors’ interview with Minister 
Mehmet Keçeciler, July 2013).   
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approval before the issue became a divisive one within Turkey (Efegil 2002; Hale 
2000).  
 The decision to bring the motion to parliament created considerable 
disagreement among the ruling Motherland Party, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Chief of Staff. The motion created tension because it was perceived as a war 
decision on a country that did not attack Turkey and as giving a “green light” for the 
utilization of US bases in Turkey.  However, President Özal, similar to the first 
occasion for decision, was effective in using his influence over the Prime Minister 
and did not refrain from publicly criticizing those who were reluctant, such as the 
Chief of Staff and military officials, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
opponents in the Motherland Party.  However, unlike the first occasion, Özal could 
not act alone, given the constitutional structural constraints. 
 The situation became more tense when US Secretary of State Baker, on his 
visit to Ankara on 9 August, 1990, requested (1) the use of US bases located in 
Turkey for an air campaign in Northern Iraq, (2) the movement of Turkish troops to 
the Turkey-Iraq border to help deter Saddam Hussein from moving his troops to 
Southern Iraq, and (3) the dispatch of a Turkish battalion to Saudi Arabia to join 
allied forces assembling there (Pertman 1990). Özal immediately authorized Prime 
Minister Akbulut and the cabinet to get the necessary parliamentary approval. The 
office of the Prime Minister prepared a memorandum asking Parliament to grant the 
government the power to send Turkish troops abroad and permit the stationing of 
foreign troops in Turkey.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was once again left in the 
dark.  After intense parliamentary debates, a bill, which articulated that the 
government requested “permission” (not “power”) to declare war only “in case of 
aggression against our country” was approved (Hale 2000).  
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 Özal, finding the bill too restrictive and not operational, further pushed to 
persuade members of parliament to approve an “unconditional authorization” that 
would give him control over the decision.  He became personally involved in 
preparing a new memorandum alongside the Council of Ministers in which he asked 
for more power for the government with regard to sending Turkish troops to foreign 
countries and allowing foreign forces to be stationed in Turkey.  Despite the rejection 
and/or abstinence of 30 members of the ruling Motherland Party during the vote on 
the motion on 5 September, 1990, parliament gave permission to the Council of 
Ministers to send Turkish troops and to allow the stationing of foreign forces in 
Turkey.  The limits and scope of such actions were to be determined by the 
government even if Turkey was not attacked (Oğuz 2005: 70; Journal of Proceedings 
of the Parliament [TBMM Tutanak Dergisi], 1 September, 1990). Yet, parliament 
rejected the government’s request for permission to declare war (Hale 2000). 
Although the authoritative decision unit was not President Özal in this occasion, he 
was still extremely influential in the decision outcome and constantly challenged 
structural constraints. 
 
The 2003 Iraq War and Occasions for Decisions 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush administration 
perceived the Iraqi regime as a threat to US security. Iraq was allegedly equipped with 
weapons of mass destruction and consequently the US government began its planning 
for a military operation in 2002.  The operation began on 20 March, 2003.   
The US preference to open a northern front via Turkey in the Iraqi War 
became an important issue in Ankara in December 2002 and January 2003, only 
months after the newly elected Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
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Partisi, AKP hereafter) came to power.  Although sympathetic to US worries, the 
newly created government was hesitant to support the US initiative directly as many 
Turks saw a possible invasion of Iraq by the United States as nothing more than an act 
of aggression (Kapsis 2006; Gözen 2005).  The US decision to invade Iraq, with or 
without Turkish support, proved to be the first major challenge for the new 
government that was largely inexperienced and wanting to please both the US 
government and the Turkish public.  This would prove difficult as approximately 90 
per cent of the Turkish public opposed the US intervention, seeing it as unlawful and 
unethical (Gözen 2005), and most Turks (86%) were also against the stationing of US 
troops in Turkey for the invasion (Özdamar and Taydaş 2012).  The anti-war and anti-
American sentiments in the Turkish population resulted from the nature of the on-
going US-Turkish negotiations and how the United States treated Turkey, as well as 
from Turkey’s experience during the first Gulf War (Özdamar and Taydaş 2012).  
Public opinion mattered more than usual during this period, although it remained only 
one of the factors influencing Turkish leaders.   
 The rejection of the motion by the Turkish parliament on 1 March, 2003 is 
usually considered to be the critical event in Turkey’s decision on the 2003 Iraqi war.  
Yet, there were four important occasions for decision.  These included (1) the 
February 6 motion: if Turkey should authorize the United States to upgrade US 
military bases in Turkey in preparation for the impending war; (2) the March 1 
motion: if Turkey should allow the United States to station troops in Turkey as a base 
for a Northern front, (3) the March 20 motion: if the United States should be given 
over-flight rights; and (4) the October 7 motion: if Turkey should send its own troops 
to Iraq (Yetkin 2004: 100).  
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Among these, we focus on the second and third occasions for decision, as 
they proved to be the most contentious.  Although neither Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
who was not part of the cabinet during the initial stage due to legal constraints7 nor 
Abdullah Gül had “the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed” 
(Hermann 2001: 48), both acted as prominent political actors in both occasions for 
decision.  Following by-elections, Erdoğan was elected to parliament on March 9 and 
replaced Gül as Prime Minister on 14 March, 2003. Gül was appointed Foreign 
Affairs Minister the same day.  Although these changes took place as negotiations 
about Turkey’s involvement in the Iraqi war were underway, Erdoğan, as head of the 
AKP and prime minister-to-be, was the leading figure from the very beginning of the 
process.  According to Taydaş and Özdamar, “Erdoğan acted as de facto prime 
minister and led the Iraq war talks with the United States, even though he had no 
formal powers.  He tried to show the members of the party that he was, indeed, in 
charge” (2013: 234). The Minister of Foreign Affairs during the time of the crisis, 
Yaşar Yakış, also confirmed that he and Prime Minister Gül consulted with Erdoğan 
on highly critical decisions concerning the crisis.8   
 
Deployment of US Troops in Turkey for a Northern Front  
The first written request from Turkey was sent on 19 November, 2002, asking 
the Turkish government to allow the US personnel that were permanently based in 
Turkey to prepare the US bases for use during the war. Both the military officials and 
the foreign ministry bureaucrats completed a detailed report strongly recommending 
Turkey’s support to the US-led coalition before the gathering of the MGK on January 
                                                
7 In 1998, after reciting a poem that allegedly incited religious hatred, Erdoğan was imprisoned and 
banned from running for political office.  
8 Interview with Yaşar Yakış, August 2013.  
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31.  They criticized the indecisive attitude of the government and insisted it make a 
decision urgently (Yetkin 2004). Despite MGK’s green light to eventual participation 
in military action against Iraq, the government refrained from making a clear 
decision.  Prime Minister Gül hoped to prevent war by visiting countries in the region 
and sending Turkish officials to meet with Iraqi officials to persuade Saddam Hussein 
to comply with the sanctions regime (Yetkin 2004). This was partly because he knew 
that he would have difficulty convincing his party members to vote in favour of a 
motion supporting US deployment and opening a northern front in the Iraq War 
(Yetkin 2004).  
On 6 February, 2003 by a vote of 308 to 193, the Turkish parliament passed 
Resolution 759, giving power to the government to open a number of Turkish bases to 
US specialists for war preparation.  The motion represented the government’s 
willingness to cooperate with the United States.  Some parliamentarians adamantly 
rejected that this was a “blank check” of support for the US-led coalition.  The 
government, however, was already in negotiations with the Bush administration 
regarding Turkish involvement in the war.  In these negotiations, Turkey set forth a 
number of conditions for its involvement, including deployment of defence 
capabilities at its border with Iraq to manage any refugee flow, US economic aid to 
compensate for losses from the war, and partnership with the United States in 
overseeing the distribution and recollection of sophisticated weapons to opposition 
groups in northern Iraq.    
The Turkish government and US officials had an understanding that an 
agreement was in the making.  The negotiations regarding a deal almost concluded by 
the third week of February.  Before a cabinet meeting on 24 February, 2003, Foreign 
Minister Yaşar Yakış said that an agreement in principle, yet unofficial and not final, 
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was reached on the political and military conditions of US deployment, and only a 
few issues remained concerning the economic aid package.  Turkey was to be offered 
$2 billion in aid and $24 billion in loan provision (Bölükbaşı 2008). Turkey and the 
United States, however, were unable to reach a final agreement (Yetkin 2004).   
Hesitant to put a motion to parliamentary vote and ask for delegation of power 
from parliament to allow the deployment of US troops in Turkey and Turkish troops 
to Iraq especially without a written agreement, the AKP government received more 
pressure from the United States, despite major disagreements regarding the details of 
Turkey’s involvement within the Turkish leadership (Yetkin 2004). Finally, the US 
administration asked the Turkish government to make a decision within 48 hours.   
This pressure further intensified divisions among policymakers in Ankara.  
Some cabinet ministers were in favour, while others opposed deployment of US 
forces and Turkey’s involvement in the conflict.  While the MGK, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the Turkish Armed Forces were generally pro-deployment, 
President Necdet Sezer, most of the deputies in the parliament including the 
opposition parties, and the speaker of the parliament Bülent Arınç (AKP) were against 
it (Yanatma 2008).  The newly elected AKP government and especially Gül, as 
temporary Prime Minister, were reluctant to take responsibility.  Gül wanted to 
diffuse accountability by emphasizing that the military favoured direct involvement 
(Yetkin 2003; 2004) and sought public affirmation from the military, which could 
help the government share responsibility for a war decision.  Tellingly, before sending 
the motion asking for deployment, the cabinet decided to wait until the MGK meeting 
on 28 February, 2003 with the expectation of a strong recommendation from the 
military.  The military, on the other hand, was waiting for a political decision and 
refrained from publicly announcing an opinion (Bölükbaşı 2008; Yetkin 2004).  
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AKP leader Erdoğan was conflicted on the decision.  Although he was 
sensitive to the overwhelming public opposition and the reservations within his own 
party, he felt that the newly-elected Islamic-associated government could not risk 
going against the United States, Turkey’s most important long-standing ally.  “In the 
end, Erdoğan chose the middle ground and gave the impression that he did not 
strongly support either option.  He asked the government to move with negotiations 
and preparations for the war, but in public, he did not strongly support the motion” 
(Taydaş and Özdamar 2013: 235). 
Erdoğan and Gül decided to send a motion to parliament.  The motion asked 
parliament to allow 62,000 US troops (also 255 warplanes and 65 helicopters) to be 
stationed in Turkey as well as the right for Turkey to deploy 40,000 troops in 
coordination with the US in northern Iraq (Robins 2003a).  Parliament voted on the 
motion on 1 March, 2003, only to reject it.  While the motion gained a numeric 
majority (264 to 250) it failed to receive the simple majority of all legislators because 
of 19 abstentions.  By all accounts, the party leadership was surprised at the outcome 
(Taydaş and Özdamar 2013; Yetkin 2003). 
 
Opening of Turkish Air Space 
On 14 March, 2003 five days after winning a by-election, Erdoğan became 
Prime Minister.  Even before the changes in the cabinet, the AKP leadership had 
agreed to present a new motion to parliament and pursue it with great vigour when the 
right time came (Robins 2003a).  The argument this time was that the new bill should 
not directly commit Turkey to participate in the Iraq war, but allow the United States 
to use its bases in Turkey.   
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The new motion was sent to parliament for a March 20 vote as Article 92 
required.  Unlike the March 1 motion, two leaders were more pro-active in this 
occasion: Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök and AKP leader and new Prime Minister 
Erdoğan. Özkök declared publicly that the military supported the government’s 
position (Yetkin 2004: 186).  According to the military, Turkey should not be 
completely left outside of the events in Iraq and should have a say in re-shaping the 
new Iraq.  For Özkök, by just wishing the war did not happen and doing nothing, 
Turkey would be hurt (Balbay 2004).  Such a clear and strong declaration by the 
military was influential in the second decision.  
Erdoğan also took important extra measures before the parliamentary vote.  
Tellingly, he did not reappoint Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır to the new cabinet as deputy 
Prime Minister, who eventually voted against the bill. Moreover, there were several 
“closed-door” meetings that Erdoğan held with AKP deputies before the vote.  The 
bill was approved on March 20, following a 332-202 vote and one abstention.  This 
result gave the government power to grant the United States overflight rights to 
conduct bombing missions and to send Special Forces to northern Iraq to engage Iraqi 
forces.     
  
Structural Factors in the 1991 and 2003 Iraqi War Decisions 
 In these occasions for decisions, structural constraints were very similar or 
were indeterminate.  For both cases, Turkey’s most important strategic ally, the 
United States, offered rewards to and put pressure on Turkey to secure Turkish 
cooperation in the military conflicts.  The threat of a destabilized Iraq and what that 
would mean for Kurdish aspirations for independence and for refugees into Turkey 
were also operative in both cases and decision-makers had to decide if it was better to 
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be involved and have some post-conflict influence on Iraq, even if it opposed the 
invasions.  The economic costs on Turkey of a war, despite promises of off-setting aid 
from the United States, were additional constraints that Turkish leaders had to 
consider in 1991 and 2003. 
 Certainly, the international structure differed in other ways across these time 
periods.  In 1991, the Cold War had only just ended.  The Soviet Union still existed, 
was an ally of Iraq, and was an important factor in US and UN decision-making.  In 
2003, the bipolar international structure had clearly given way to the military 
hegemon, the United States.  Arguably, Turkey was more constrained by the 
international structures in 1991.  As a middle power, it was clearly dependent on the 
United States during the Cold War.  By 2003, Turkey had successfully charted a more 
independent foreign policy.  This clear difference in the international system, 
however, did not have automatic consequences.  Not all Turkish leaders in 1991 
believed that there was nothing Turkey could do but support the United States.  Even 
the military was willing to defy the ally’s pressure.  And it would be difficult to argue 
that Özal was simply acting as a pawn of the United States or succumbed to US 
pressure against his will.  Similarly, in 2003, not all thought Turkey was “free” to 
ignore the request of the United States.  Indeed, Erdoğan believed it was necessary to 
support the United States, for Turkey’s interests.  Thus, differences in international 
structures cannot account for the different outcomes and processes of these cases. 
Internal structures were very similar across the cases.  In the first Iraqi War 
decisions, the Motherland Party was a single party government, controlling a majority 
of votes in parliament, and all cabinet positions.  The cabinet was formed after Özal 
left the leadership of the Motherland Party following his election to Presidency.  
Similarly, in the second Iraqi War decision occasions, the cabinet was composed 
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entirely of AKP deputies and this single party commanded a parliamentary majority.  
In both cases, there were divisions within the ruling parties: in 1991, some 
Motherland Party members, led by Mesut Yılmaz, blamed President Özal for reckless 
foreign policy behaviour and in 2003, Bülent Arınç, the speaker of the parliament and 
Yalçınbayır, deputy Prime Minister, opposed the war in general and US requests from 
Turkey.  In both cases, key bureaucratic and military actors were either pushing for 
their own policy preference or remained strategically silent.  Another important 
structural constant was the constitutional constraints that were identical across these 
occasions. Article 92 of the Constitution did not allow decisions to be made by the 
cabinet or a single leader only, and gave the power to Parliament to decide on war 
powers.  
 Despite these constraints, Özal did not refrain from pressuring the Prime 
Minister and the cabinet or from using his personal influence on certain deputies in 
parliament to get a decision to his liking in the first Iraqi War.  Once parliament 
granted the cabinet war powers, Özal conducted all negotiations with US authorities, 
shadowing the government. In both occasions for decision, Özal sidelined the 
traditional policymakers like the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
replaced representatives from these actors with his own advisors and supporters. 
Unlike previous presidents, Özal went further by interpreting Article 104 of the 
Constitution to its fullest in a way to use the maximum authority given to the 
President (Kılıç, 1990). He was quick to note that as President, he was the Chief of 
the Army, and head of the MGK, and therefore empowered with the mandate of the 
parliament to authorize Turkish troops when parliament is in recess. With this he 
almost saw himself equal to the Prime Minister and the cabinet and acted as if Turkey 
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had a Presidential system.  In this way, Özal challenged considerable domestic 
constraints to secure his preferred outcome in the 1991 Gulf War. 
The decision-making process in the first occasion for decision of the second 
Iraqi War was also very complex and involved multiple actors; actions required 
parliamentary approval but the leadership of AKP was divided.  Erdoğan did not have 
any official position in the government at the time but was nevertheless effectively in 
charge of the party.  Furthermore, Gül did not act as a predominant leader, instead 
trying to spread the responsibility for the decision.  It is telling that AKP leader 
Erdoğan did not push hard for approval of the motion either. He held a group meeting 
on 25-26 February, in which he asked party members to vote in favour of the bill.  He 
later asked AKP deputies to write down their preferences on a piece of paper.  The 
results suggested that the majority of the deputies would be voting for the motion, and 
that the motion would pass by more than enough votes (Taydaş and Özdamar 2013: 
236).  This might explain why Erdoğan refrained from taking a group decision at this 
meeting that would have required the AKP to vote en bloc on 1 March.  The decision 
was left solely to the parliament. In this sense, this particular occasion was completely 
different from the 1991 decision in which Özal displayed a forceful leadership 
challenging constraints at the risk of creating a domestic political crisis.  
As the case studies illustrate, despite similarities in structural factors the 
decisions reached in the first and second Iraqi War decisions were significantly 
different from each other. Turkey largely complied with the United States in 1991 and 
did so only moderately and belatedly in 2003.  These differences cannot easily be 
traced to different structural pressures or opportunities.  Furthermore, both agents who 
were key in these decisions –Özal and Erdoğan– favoured cooperation with the 
United States.  What is different is how they interacted with the various structures 
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they faced. In what follows below, we examine the personality traits of Turgut Özal 
and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to help us better understand how these two leaders reacted 
to internal and external constraints. 
 
 
Adding Agents’ Orientations to Structures: 
Özal and Erdoğan’s Leadership Trait Analysis 
Table 1 shows scores for Özal and Erdoğan on each of the seven personality 
traits, as well as the mean scores for the comparison groups composed of world 
leaders and a smaller set of Middle Eastern leaders.  Özal and Erdoğan have very 
similar scores for belief in ability to control events, in-group bias, distrust of others, 
and task focus.  The traits for which the two leaders differ are conceptual complexity, 
need for power, and self-confidence. In this section, we focus on the differences in the 
leaders’ traits and explore how they contribute to our understanding of the case 
studies and the dissimilar processes and outcomes in the foreign policies of these 
leaders. For space considerations, we make reference to the world leader comparison 
group; comparisons using the Middle East norming group are almost identical with no 
significant change in our interpretation of the differences between Özal and Erdoğan.  
Our aim is to use LTA traits to provide reliable, systematic assessment for an 
understanding of which and how characteristics of agents affect their interactions with 
structures.  Our purpose here is also to critically evaluate the specific traits of LTA for 
their ability to explain leadership behaviour. 
 
–Table 1 here–   
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Özal scores higher (almost one standard deviation above) than Erdoğan on the 
self-confidence trait. Erdoğan’s score (.36) equals the mean for the world leaders 
comparison group; Özal (.45) is almost one standard deviation higher than the world 
mean.  Leaders with high self-confidence have an elevated sense of self-importance 
and “…are more immune to incoming information from the environment than those 
with low self-confidence.  They are generally satisfied with who they are and are not 
searching for more material on which to evaluate themselves and their behaviour” 
(Hermann 2003: 195). Leaders with low self-confidence, on the other hand, “…are 
easily buffeted by the ‘contextual winds.’  Without a well-developed sense of who 
they are, such leaders tend to continually seek out information from the environment 
in order to know what to do and how to confirm to the demands of the circumstances 
in which they find themselves….To compensate for feelings of inadequacy, these 
leaders seek to become the agents…that can help to enhance their self-confidence” 
(Hermann 2003: 196).  
The difference in Özal and Erdoğan’s self-confidence, as measured at the 
particular time of these decisions, can help explain their dissimilar leadership styles in 
the cases.  Özal’s higher self-confidence enabled him to challenge and manipulate 
domestic constraints, including constitutional limitations on his authority. He also did 
not hesitate to use his influence directly or indirectly.  Sanctions against Iraq were 
solely and promptly decided by Özal despite the wait and see policy of the other 
actors.  He pursued his interests and realized his policy preferences by ensuring 
transfer of power to himself, being in direct contact with President Bush, assuming 
the lead negotiator role, and obtaining legislation that would also give him a big 
leeway in negotiations with the US.  He used his power bluntly and excluded many 
people from the process to achieve his desired policy outcome.  Özal was dismissive 
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towards those who stood in his way, sidelining or eliminating them in the decision-
making process.  Excluding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucrats from 
decision-making, he created a domestic political crisis that led to three resignations.  
Özal’s self-confidence can be seen in his firm belief in the “right thing that needed to 
be done,” which was to join the US-led coalition and get Iraq out of Kuwait and in his 
adamant pursuit of this policy even at the expense of domestic political relations.  
Erdoğan, on the other hand, did not have the high confidence to direct the 
process at the time.  Instead, he let the process unfold itself in the beginning.  Unlike 
Özal, he delegated decision-making and negotiations to Gül and Yakış, other people 
from his party, as well as bureaucrats.  Even when he advised AKP deputies in late 
February to vote for US troop deployment in Turkey, Erdoğan did not take a group 
decision or display a forceful leadership.  Similarly, whereas he took charge of the 
process and acted more decisively and forcefully during the second occasion for 
decision, he still took others’ advice in the policymaking circles into account. 
Özal and Erdoğan also differ in conceptual complexity.  Özal has a higher 
score (.66) than Erdoğan (.58) and is one standard deviation above the mean for the 
world leader group, while Erdoğan is one standard deviation below Özal and has 
almost the same score as the world leaders mean.  Conceptual complexity indicates 
the ability of the leader to differentiate, describe, or discuss other people, places, 
policies, or ideas in a complex manner.  Leaders that have high conceptual complexity 
see various dimensions of an issue, are more comfortable with uncertainty, and are 
flexible in their reactions to ideas.  Such leaders seek a variety of perspectives and are 
attuned to contextual information.  Leaders who have low conceptual complexity tend 
to see positions as black-and-white, are unaware of ambiguity in their environment, 
and are inflexible in their reactions to ideas.  Such leaders often act based on their 
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intuition and prefer action to analysis, planning, or an extensive search for 
information (Hermann 2003). 
  The differences in complexity between Özal and Erdoğan can be 
meaningfully interpreted in the cases.  Özal’s higher complexity may have given him 
the ability, not just the motivation, to carefully engineer and dominate the decision-
making.  Consistent with conceptually complex leaders, Özal was in constant 
communication with foreign leaders and closely monitored the developments in the 
crisis by seeking first-hand information from his foreign counterparts especially, US 
President Bush.  Among Turkish leaders, Özal was one of the few who talked with a 
wide variety of foreign correspondents and journalists on a variety of related topics 
such as with experts from OPEC and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation on the 
effects of crisis for the global oil market.  He often explained Turkey’s position 
during the crisis and asked how they saw events.  In his speeches on the crisis, Özal 
often relied on and disclosed facts about the crisis (e.g. oil prices, new power balance, 
alliances, trade relations, threat perception) and how other countries in the world, and 
especially the Western allies of Turkey, positioned themselves.  He often used factual 
data in order to convince the opposition. Erdoğan, on the other hand, was not very 
successful in manipulating the environment and getting the result he desired, 
especially in the first occasion of decision.  He was also not actively seeking 
information, especially from sources outside of Turkey.  Inside the country, he was 
surprised at the outcome of the parliamentary vote. 
The third trait on which Özal and Erdoğan differ is need for power.  Özal (.22) 
is almost one standard deviation lower than the mean of the comparison group; but 
Erdoğan’s score (.31) is both above the world leaders average and almost two 
standard deviations higher than Özal’s.  According to Hermann (2003), leaders with a 
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high need for power have a strong desire to control or influence others.  “They are 
good at sizing up situations and sensing what tactics will work to achieve their goals.  
Indeed, they are highly Machiavellian, often working behind the scenes to insure their 
positions prevail….Leaders high in need for power will test the limits before adhering 
to a course of action, bartering and bargaining up until the last moment to see what is 
possible…” (p. 191).  Leaders who are low in power, on the other hand, are 
comfortable allowing others to lead and have influence.  They put the group’s interest 
before their own and empower others around them to share responsibility. 
Özal’s and Erdoğan’s scores on this trait do not resonate well in the case 
studies.  Instead, Özal acts much more like a leader with a high need for power, 
skilfully manipulating the policy making process, driven by his desire to influence the 
decisions. Erdoğan, on the other hand does not behave much like a leader with a high 
need for power.  Although he does take greater responsibility and seeks to influence 
the outcome in the second decision, overall, he does not appear Machiavellian-like. 
Despite the importance of the other LTA traits in previous research on leaders’ 
personalities and foreign policy, this study finds no critical differences between Özal 
and Erdoğan in terms of their belief in ability to control events (both are around the 
world leaders mean), distrust (both are close to the mean of the world leaders), and in-
group bias (both are one standard deviation below the mean), and task focus (both are 
one standard deviation higher than the world leaders mean). 
 Two of the traits that differ between Özal and Erdoğan, self-confidence and 
conceptual complexity, do help explain these leaders’ dissimilar interactions with 
their structural context in theoretically meaningful ways.  This suggests that these 
traits, and their combinations, deserve more attention in future research.  Furthermore, 
conceptual complexity may relate to leaders’ abilities to manipulate constraints as 
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much as it relates to leaders’ openness to a variety of perspectives.  Finally, Erdoğan’s 
profile may be sensitive to this particular time period, reflecting his high need for 
power in time as he learns to control others around him. The time period considered 
for this study is a peculiar one as he was just elected to a national political office and 
right after his domestic political ban on him. Consistent with personality theory that 
stresses the interaction between the agent and the context: as the context changes, 
individuals may adapt to new situations within certain parameters of their personality 
traits.  Some leaders, however, such as Erdoğan, are much more likely to be sensitive 
to contextual changes and learning opportunities than others (Hermann 2003).  
Specifically, we would also predict that his self-confidence would increase over his 
tenure in office.  As a result, he would become more dominant in the decision-making 
process over time. 
 Indeed, a key difference between Özal and Erdoğan is their levels of 
experience.  Özal is a much more seasoned politician during the decision-making for 
the first Iraqi war; Erdoğan is only just coming to power in a national office during 
the decision-making for the second Iraqi war.  Erdoğan’s lower scores for self-
confidence and complexity and his higher need for power may be related to his lack 
of experience at this time.  This does not mean, however, that Erdoğan personality 
profile is merely a reflection of his new role – leaders’ beliefs do change over time 
(Renshon 2008), especially those that are more sensitive to their environments 
(Hermann 2003).  Furthermore, not all new leaders are low in self-confidence and 
complexity and high in need for power.  Hermann (1980) has suggested that 
experience acts as an intervening variable.  Leaders with more experience may rely on 
their background and thus their personalities and predispositions matter less than 
those new to the position.  We do not see this dynamic in the case studies.  While 
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Erdoğan’s lack of experience may be reflected in his traits at this time, Özal’s traits 
do not seem to be muffled by his experience.  Quite the contrary, Özal’s considerable 
experience seems to interact with his predispositions as he skilfully manipulated the 
process and challenged constraints.   
 
Conclusions 
According to a prominent volume on operational code research (Schafer and 
Walker 2006), it is the intersection of agent and structure at which foreign policy 
researchers should be focused and where future work will yield the most returns. 
Other theorizing supports this idea, but few directly address the orientation of agents 
to structural constraints and most of our understanding of security policy decidedly 
privileges structural explanations in systemic, institutional, and cultural forms.  This 
study directly engaged this topic by examining how leaders interact with their 
institutional, political, and situational contexts and by tracing the effects of leaders’ 
personalities.   
Despite similar or indeterminate structural constraints, Turkey’s 1991 and 
2003 Iraqi war decisions differed significantly in terms of process and outcome. We 
argue that the difference in the outcomes cannot be explained by structural constraints 
alone.  Based upon process-tracing, we demonstrated variation in leaders’ orientations 
to and interactions with structures.  Working under very similar contextual 
constraints, Özal and Erdoğan used different tactics and strategies.  For example, 
whereas Özal managed to dictate his preferences and effectively utilized his leverage 
over the Prime Minister and cabinet, Erdoğan allowed the process to unfold and in the 
end, was not always able to secure his preferred outcome. Indeed, Erdoğan was 
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pushed and pulled by the different preferences of the United States, the military, and 
his own party.   
The differences in Özal’s and Erdoğan’s self-confidence and conceptual 
complexity, we conclude, underpin their approaches in these cases.  The content 
analytic LTA framework provides a valuable tool for specifying the characteristics of 
agents and how they relate to their contexts.  The combination of LTA with 
structured-focused and process-tracing comparative case studies is an especially 
fruitful approach to study the nuanced agency-structure interaction. Overall, the 
differences in how these leaders interacted with their decision making environments 
and the dissimilar decision outcomes in similar situations support the view that a 
given structure may be interpreted and acted upon differently by leaders who may 
have different styles and traits and that leaders are not equally constrained or 
empowered by constraints.    
Our examination of Özal and Erdoğan is an important contribution as it adds 
theoretically to the study of leaders and international politics and empirically to our 
understanding of Turkish leaders and Turkish foreign policy.  As a strategic ally to the 
United States, as a member of NATO, and as an increasingly important economic and 
regional power, Turkey’s choices can have a major impact in international politics.  
Although they often have to coordinate policy choices with the military, coalition 
partners, and international actors, Turkish Prime Ministers and Presidents have 
considerable influence in foreign policy decision-making.   How they see the world, 
how they choose to react to challenges, and what informs their preferences are 
significant to an understanding of Turkish foreign policy.  Scholars of Turkish foreign 
policy are not alone in continuing to privilege structural factors over agents; leaders 
characteristics are under-theorized and rarely investigated in general international 
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relations research.  Yet a complete understanding of international politics and 
decision making processes and outcomes requires serious theoretical and empirical 
attention to how characteristics of agents shape leaders’ orientations to systemic, 
institutional, and situational constraints.  LTA, and other approaches to political 
personalities (e.g., operational code research and cognitive mapping) offer conceptual 
grounding and reliable methods for capturing this relationship.   
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Table 1: LTA Profile of Özal and Erdoğan on Seven Personality Traitsa 
Personality Trait Özal Erdoğan World Mean 
[N=284] 
(standard 
deviation) 
Middle East 
Mean 
[N=46] 
(standard 
deviation) 
Belief In Ability To 
Control Events 
0.35 0.37 0.35 
(.05) 
0.33 
(.06) 
Conceptual 
Complexity  
0.66 0.58 0.59 
(.06) 
0.56 
(.08) 
Distrust of Others  0.09 0.11 0.13 
(.06) 
0.16 
(.07) 
In-Group Bias  0.10 0.10 0.15 
(.05) 
0.15 
(.06) 
Need for Power  0.22 0.31 0.26 
(.05) 
0.27 
(.06) 
Self-Confidence  0.45 0.36 0.36 
(.10) 
0.31 
(.13) 
Task Focus  0.70 0.73 0.63 
(.07) 
0.58 
(.06) 
 
a World and Middle East means and standard deviation numbers obtained from 
Margaret Hermann (email communication). These were calculated from data created 
by the ProfilerPlus program (version 5.8.4). 
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